本文从法律制度的角度对高薪养廉进行了系统的分析论证，得出了对公职人员的适当高薪是有助于养廉的结论，高薪将导致腐败行为总数量上的减少，并且还有利于通过市场上的人才流动，来自动地优化国家公职人员的结构、精简机构。本文运用法理和法史合参的方法，通过论证、归纳、对比等方法来阐述了高薪养廉的作用和局限，指出了实施高薪养廉的条件和充分发挥高薪养廉作用所需要的其他制度配合。
在论述过程中，本文总结提出了腐败的三大根本原因在于：权力资源的稀缺性、人的私本性、由于公权力行使过程不得不借助于私的人而导致权力的异化。
本文分析了高薪养廉制度在古今中外实施的历史和现状，从中提炼出成败得失的原因和对我国现实社会的借鉴意义，并最终提出了把高薪养廉和我国具体国情相结合的一些看法。
在进行历史事实的梳理和境外经验的借鉴的基础上，本文围绕着高薪养廉制度进行了理论上的深入阐述，从人性的私本性的论述指出了将把人性预设为私的重要意义；从人的需求层次理论论述指出了高薪养廉的边际效用，和在此基础上采取渐进的方式逐步摸索确定高薪养廉的最佳平衡点以发挥最佳效用而防止因支出过大而效用递减导致的得不偿失；本文更通过法经济学的分析，论述指出了几大可以用来分析包括高薪养廉制度在内的反腐败法律制度的经济学数学模型：（1）“腐败成本＝预备成本＋机会成本＋处罚成本”；（2）“预备成本＝取得权力的成本×被处罚的概率”；（3）“处罚成本＝处罚尺度×被处罚的概率”。在这些公式下，我们可以清楚地看到，高薪养廉在预备成本和处罚成本两方面提高了了腐败的成本，在其它变量不变的情况下将导致腐败数量的减少，因而高薪制度对于养廉是有效的，它以使一部分潜在的腐败者因需求得到满足而放弃腐败，并且它还通过增加腐败成本来作用于私的人群，使手握公权力的人们在私本质的作用下趋利避害而放弃腐败的企图。
本文还对高薪养廉制度的局限性进行了理性而清醒的分析，由于高薪养廉制度对权力的稀缺性和权力的异化没有影响力，它也不是从根本上抑制人类的私本质本身，而是与私本质妥协的结果，所以它在反腐败上是具有不彻底性的，这种不彻底性也导致了它的局限性。这种局限性主要表现在首先高薪养廉制度对法制建设具有依赖性，它无法独立地起作用，而只是反腐败措施之一；其次高薪养廉制度无法防大贪、巨贪，它只对降低腐败行为的数量上有作用。
解决腐败问题的重点应当是根除腐败的内在根源，而正如本文指出的那样，当这三种内在根源在可预见的历史时期内不可能得以根除的情况下，我们也许只能退而求其次，谋求把腐败抑制在一个社会可以容忍的范围内。高薪养廉制度的论证，正是在这样一种背景和认识下提出的。这项改革的经济代价可能是十分昂贵的，本文也因此在论述高薪养廉制度时提出了相应的减少这种代价和阵痛的方案。然而这些代价是必须付出的，高薪养廉制度一定能够在中国的反腐败斗争中，找到一席之地，为中国的反腐败法制添上一笔重彩！
Legal Survey on “High Salary for Clean Government”
（Dissertation abstract of Professional Degree of Law Master）
Speciality：Jural Master
Study area：Jurisprudence
Name：Cao Chenghong
Advisior：Chen Pengsheng
In this article, the author carries out a systematic analysis and argumentation of “high salary for clean government”, draw the conclusion that appropriate high salary for officials do good to the probity and cleanness of government. High salary will lead to the decrease of total corruption deals, promote automatically optimization of government officials'structure and organization. Jurisprudence and law history study path, argumentation、reasoning and comparison method are used in this paper, the function and limitation of high salary system are discussed, the basis implementation requirements and other related institutions for high salary institution are also studied in detail.
In this paper, the author gives three fundamental reasons of corruption: (1) the scarcity of power resource;(2) the selfish of humanism;(3) the operation of public power is executed by man, which easily lead to power aberrance.
The history and current situation of high salary institution in clean government construction are discussed, from it we can extract some successful and failing causations, which may be good references for our current society. How to design “high salary institution for a clean government” institution under our current text, the author also gives his own opinion。
After the reading and survey of historic facts, and the introduction of foreign experience，this article mainly focuses on the theory explanation of “high salary for clean government” institution in detail. The author points out the selfish attribute of humanity, and its implied important meaning .On the basis of human demand level theory, he points out the marginal utilization of “high salary in clean government”, it demonstrates that we should follow a gradually institutional innovation path ,to determine the optimal balance point of high salary institution to exert its effects .Further, this article use law economics path, successfully set up several mathematical economic model to analysis anti-corruption law system, which “high salary for clean government” system is included :（1）“Corruption cost＝Preparation Cost + Opportunity cost＋Punitive Cost;（2）“Preparation Cost＝Power acquired cost×Punish probability”；（3）“Punitive cost＝Punitive scale×Punish probability”.Under these formulas, we can obviously find high salary system do increase corruption cost, especially preparation cost and punitive cost, give the other variants unchanged, it leads to the decrease of general amount of corruption. So high salary system do good to the formation o
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